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Abstract
The study analyzed the determinants of land tenure insecurity in Uganda using survey data
collected by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) during the Policies for
Improved Land Management Project in Uganda, 1999-2001. The survey included a sample of 1322
farm households randomly selected and interviewed using a formal questionnaire. The analysis
revealed that tenure category, number of households in the village involved in disputes
outside the village, and the number of households in the village who lost land as a result of a
dispute over land were significant factors affecting tenure insecurity.
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LAND TENURE AND SOCIOECONOMIC INTERACTIONS
Introduction
  Uganda  was  known  as  a  major  food  source in  Africa  because  of  its  good  soil,
dependable rainfall and relatively high agricultural production.  Over time however, the
country’s agricultural sector has been characterized as low-input, semi-subsistence
agriculture (Place and Otsuka, 2002).  One of the concerns is the issue of land tenure in the
country. The country is confronted by land tenure conflicts of various types. For example, civil
wars have resulted in increased threats to and conflicts over natural resources. The traditional
rivalry between farmers and pastoralists has been fuelled at times by biased government policies.
A common perception is that the prevailing land tenure institutions are discouraging farmers
and inhibiting them from making major agricultural investments. The question of the
appropriate tenure policy has remained unresolved, although the 1995 Land Constitution and the
1999 Land Act emphasized security of tenure by Uganda’s smallholders, protection of women
and other vulnerable groups from irresponsible land sales, and promotion of investment and
smooth operation of the market.
  Numerous  land  redistribution  policies  and  socio-economic  interactions  through  the
years have left many Ugandans landless and many in disputes.  This paper therefore aims to
examine the factors affecting tenure insecurity in Uganda. The paper relates tenure
insecurity to demographic characteristics and social interactions. The paper in organized as
follows. First, a brief review of the land tenure systems in Uganda followed by a definition
of tenure insecurity and social interactions in section three. Data and econometric model are
presented in sections four and five. The last two sections present the result and conclusions.2
Land Tenure Systems in Uganda
The promulgation of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda brought with it very significant
changes.  The radical title to land was vested in the citizens of Uganda, the Land Reform Decree
was abolished and the systems of land tenure that were in existence before independence re-
instated.  These were stated as customary tenure, mailo tenure, freehold tenure and leasehold
tenure:
1) Freehold tenure involves holding of registered land in which the holder has full ownership
rights. Land is held in perpetuity subject to statutory and common law qualifications.
2) Leasehold tenure involves holding land for a given period of time specified on
commencement (validity) on such terms as may be agreed upon by lesser and lessee and may
include sublease.
3) Mailo land tenure involves holding registered land in perpetuity. This system has its roots in
the 1900 Buganda Agreement between Buganda and the British. In the central Ugandan region
of Buganda, the clan system was undermined with introduction of the mailo system, but mailo
land is still subject to clan and lineage head approval.  The Busuulu and Envujjo Law of 1928
made it difficult for landlords to evict tenants and set a rent ceiling.  The law increased insecurity
of tenure for mailo owners by recognizing some of the secondary rights of tenants as primary
rights, while extinguishing many primary rights of the owners.  The 1975 Reform Decree, then
gave mailo owners more powers to evict the tenant upon issuing a six-month notice.  Thus there
was a shift in legal control over mailo land, now in favor of the State and the owner.  Although
many mailo owners still perceived themselves as owners of the land, those with tenants have
rarely taken steps of evicting them.3
4) Customary tenure is a system of land tenure regulated by customary rules often administered
by clan leaders. The customary system predominates in Uganda. Within this system there can be
both individual and communal land ownership, but the land is not generally titled or registered.
Since 1966, tenure security in this land area has been low and unpredictable (Place and Otsuka,
2002).
Tenure Insecurity and Social Interactions
Tenure insecurity is defined as the perceived probability or likelihood of losing
ownership of a part or the whole of one’s land without his/her consent (Sjaastad and
Bromley 1997, Alemu 1999). The strength of this perception may have a bearing on how
farmers manage their land and this in turn has an effect on agricultural production and
sustenance of the people who directly depend on it.  A lot of authors have stated that
tenure insecurity discourages farm operations and land investments.
Kisamba-mugerwa (1989), found that there was a considerable uncertainty as to
future land rights within mailo land.  They also found out that on land occupied by tenants,
it was the owner who especially felt insecure about long-term land rights, because of
possible government land tenure reform.  Some studies addressed the effect of differences
in tenure systems and tenure security on agricultural investment while studies to determine
the causes of tenure insecurity which may identify the root cause of the problem is lacking.
Social interactions in the communities such as disputes over land have been the root
cause of civil wars and revolutions, much so because land has been the primary means of
generating livelihood for the overwhelming majority of rural population in these countries
(Deininger and Feder 1998).Furthermore, the way land tenure is instituted and the
consequent perceptions and expectations of the land holders may directly affect the way4
farms are managed (Firmin-Sellers and Sellers 1999; Maxwell and Wiebe 1999; Sjaastad
and Bromley 1997; Gavian and Ehui 1999; Alemu 1999) and this may have efficiency as
well as sustainability consequences.
Data
To analyze the determinants of land tenure insecurity in Uganda, we draw on data
from the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). The survey data were collected
during the Policies for Improved Land Management Project in Uganda, 1999-2001. In all, one
hundred villages were selected across the country and the questionnaires were administered to
107 communities, the lowest administrative units in Uganda called Local Council 1 or LC1. The
study region covered most of Uganda, including more densely populated in the southwest,
central, eastern and parts of the north, representing seven of the nine major farming systems of
the country.
Within the study region, communities were selected using a stratified random sample,
with the stratification based on population density and development domains defined by the
different agro-ecological and market access zones. Topics in the village survey included
livelihood strategies, land use, land tenure and land markets, labor, wage rates and credit, crop
production, commercialization and management, livestock management and commercialization,
tree product and commercialization. The survey also collected information on the respondents’
demographic characteristics.
Table 1 presents the variables included in the analysis and their descriptive statistics.  The
model used a dummy independent variable, tenure insecurity (SECURITY), coded as 0 when the
household feels tenure secure and 1, otherwise.  The majority (76 percent) of the respondents stated that5
they were tenure insecure. Tenure category (TENCAT) was represented as: 1 = freehold, 2 = leasehold, 3
= mailo, and 4 = customary.    Involvement in land disputes in the village (DISPVILL) was coded 1 when
the respondent experienced or is involved in a land dispute in the village and 0, otherwise.   The number of
households involved in disputes in the village (HHDSINV) was treated as a continuous variable.
Respondents’ involvement in disputes outside the village (DISPOUTV) was coded 1 when the
household had an involvement in disputes outside the village and 0, otherwise.  The number of
households in the village involved in disputes outside the village (HHDINVOV) was used as a
continuous variable.  If the respondent did lose land as a result of disputes, LOSEACC was
represented by 1 and 0, otherwise.  The number of households who lost access to land
(HHDLACC) was used as a continuous variable.  Gender was coded as 1 for males and 0 for
females.  Respondents’ age was a continuous variable while HHDHEAD was coded as 1 if the
respondent is a household head and 0 otherwise.
----------  Table  1  about  here  -------------
Model
A logit model was used to examine the relationship between tenure insecurity and
respondents’ demographic characteristics as well as social interactions.  Specifically, the model
was used to estimate the likelihood of a household being tenure insecure.
The perception of tenure insecurity and the factors affecting it are modeled as,
N = ȕX+ e,           ( 1 )
where N = 1 if the household feels tenure insecure, and 0 otherwise, X is an array of factors that may
cause or are associated with tenure insecurity, ȕ is a vector of parameters, and e, a vector of error6
terms. Assuming that the disturbances are normally distributed, the relationship between tenure
insecurity and the various factors used as independent variables was specified as:
N= ȕ0+ ȕ1TENCAT + ȕ2DISPVILL + ȕ3HHDSINV + ȕ4DISPOUTV + ȕ5HHDINVOC (2)
 + Ǻ6LOSEACC + ȕ7HHDLACC + ȕ8SEX + ȕ9AGE + ȕ10 HHDHEAD + İ
where,
N = Perception of tenure insecurity of a household (dependent variable). If a household feels tenure
insecure, the variable takes the value of 1, and 0 otherwise. Ǻ0 through ȕ10are unknown parameters to
be estimated, and İ is the error term.
The probability of a household being tenure insecure was examined using the equation:
Pi = E (Y = 1ŇXi) = b0+ Ȉ biXi (3)
Where, Piis the probability that Y equals 1 for a given value of Xi.  Xi(i = 1, 2, 3…n) represents
the explanatory variables. b0represents intercept and birepresents coefficients to be estimated.
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Where, e is the base of the natural logarithm; approximately 2.718.  For simplification, equation








Zi =b0+ biXi.  Ziis a linear combination of (b0 + b1X1 + b2X2+ b3X3+… bnXn) and ranges from
 to +; Piranges between 0 and 1.  If Piin Equation 5 represents the probability of a household7































is the odds ratio of being tenure insecure, which is the ratio of the probability that a
household is tenure insecure.
  Equation 7 is the conditional  probability  that Y is equal to 1 given Xi.  This was denoted
as P (Y = 1ŇXi).  Conversely, the quantity Y = 1 - Pi gives the conditional probability that Y is



















= b b 0 1
ln                     (8)
where L is the natural log of the odds being tenure insecure.  The model is that natural log of the
odds equal to the constant (b0) plus the product of the estimated coefficients biand Xi.
The change in probability was calculated as:
) 1 ( i i i i P P P - = Db         ( 9 )
where Pi= is the estimated probability of a household being tenure insecure in each observation;
and biis the estimated coefficient.  The change in probability (¨Pi), therefore, is a function of the8
probability of a household being tenure insecure (Pi) multiplied by the probability of being
tenure secured (1- Pi) and the estimated coefficient (bi) considering other variables constant.
Results and Discussions
Table 2 presents the logit estimation of the tenure insecurity model.  The estimated
results were interpreted using the change in probability (Equation 9).  The results show that
tenant category is a significant factor affecting tenure insecurity in Uganda.  The coefficient
exhibits a positive sign, as expected, which shows that the movement of tenure category from
freehold land to customary land is in the same direction as tenure insecurity.  This means that
tenure insecurity increases as tenure category moves from freehold to customary.  The change in
probability suggests that as a household moves from one tenure category to the next category, the
household is 10 percent more likely to feel tenure insecure.
Another significant variable affecting tenure insecurity determined by the model is the
number of households in the village involved in disputes outside the village (HHDINVOV). As
hypothesized,  the  parameter  estimated  showed  a  negative  relationship  between  tenure  insecurity  and  having  a
land dispute outside the village.   This can be explained by the reason that the level of tenure insecurity are
independent between villages, that an individual is relatively  secure  when involved in  a  dispute in  another
village as the disputes don’t directly affect his status in the village where he is.   Land disputes and tenure
insecurity in this scenario are dealt with separately from one village to another.   The change in probability
indicates that as the number of households in the village involved in disputes outside the village increases, the
lower the likelihood (4.6 %) that the households will be tenure insecure.   This analysis is in relation to testing
the  level  of  tenure  insecurity  with  households  involved  in  disputes  inside  the  village.
The number of households who lost access to any land as a result of a dispute over land rights was
determined to be  a significant factor  determining  tenure security.   The  positive  sign of HHDLACC indicates9
that if the household did lose land in the past, they are more tenure insecure for fear of losing more land, as the
cause/s of losing land in the past can be possible causes of losing another land in the future.   The change in
probability shows that as the number of households who lost land increases, the likelihood of being tenure
insecure  increases  by  4.7  percent.
--------- Table 2 about here ------
Other variables including land dispute involvement in the village, number of households
involved in disputes in the village, dispute involvement from outside the village, losing land as a
result of disputes, respondents’ age, gender, and being a household head were tested but were
found to be insignificant.  Although the R
2 (Nagelkerke) is low, 0.101, a low R
2 is acceptable in
logit regression (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). The model predicted a 77 percent of the
responses.
Conclusions
The paper analyzed the effects of tenure insecurity and socio-economic interactions on
farm households in Uganda. The results provide insights on the factors determining tenure
insecurity.  It can be concluded that there is tenure insecurity in the study area as 76 percent of
the respondents stated that they feel insecure about their land tenure.  In the model, tenant
category was found to be a significant variable affecting tenure insecurity.  Increases in the
number of households in the village involved in disputes outside the village were also found to
increase the likelihood of being tenure insecure.  Similarly, the number of households who lost
access to any land as a result of a dispute over land rights was found to be a significant factor
determining tenure security with a positive relationship.10
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Table 1.   Definition and descriptive statistics of variables













Does the respondent feel secure?
0-Secure;  1-Insecure
Tenant category
1-Freehold;  2-Leasehold;  3-Mailo;  4-Customary
Respondents  involved  in  land  disputes  in  the  village
1-Yes;  0-Otherwise
Number of  households involved in  the  dispute in  the village
Continuous
People  involved  in  disputes  from  outside  the  village
1-Yes;  0-Otherwise
Number of  households in the village involved in  disputes
outside  of  the  village
Continuous
Did anyone  lose land following  the  dispute?
1-Yes;  0-Otherwise






























Table 2.  Probability Estimates for Tenure Insecurity in Uganda



























































Model prediction success = 77%
Nagelkerke R-square        = 0.151
Log-likelihood                  = 1364.22
Sample Size                      = 1322
*denote significance at 1 percent level